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Preliminary Memorandum
November 12, 1976 Conference
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~ to

No. 76-321 CFX

CA 8 (Gibson,

~right, Van Pelt--DJ)

STENCEL AERO ENGINEERING CORP.
Federal/Civil

v.
UNITED STATES

1.

Summary.

e

This case presents the same issue as

) Qeneral Dynamics Corp. v. United States, No. 76-220, November
5 Conference, p. 3:

whether a military contractor has a valid

action for

against the United States under the Federal

inde~1ity

Tort Claims Act, 28 V.S.C. § 2674, when a ·serviceman is injured
( ~

in an aircraft constructed by the contractor and negligence of

(

the United States in designs and specifications is alleged.
2.

Facts.

John C. Donham, an Air Force Reserve pilot

assigned for training to the Missouri Air National Guard, was
seriously injured when he was forced to eject from the F-lOOD
aircraft that he was piloting.
of the plane.

Petitioner was the manufacturer

Donham sued petitioner, the United States, and

Mills Mfg. Corp., alleging that the "egress life support system"
had malfunctioned due to the negligence of the defendants.

Peti-

tioner filed a cross-claim for indemnity against the United States,
arguing that the malfunctioning was due to faulty design and
specifications imposed by the Government and the Government's
negligent maintenance after it took custody of the plane.
The district court dismissed both the claim and the crossclaim. against the United States.

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.

135 (1950), held that an injured serviceman cannot proceed directly
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
Since Donham could not recover directly from the Government, the
district court held that petitioner should not be able to recover
on a claim derived from Donham's claim.

It certified the dis-

position of the cross-claim as final under Rule 54(b) , and petitioner appealed to CA 8.

CA 8 affirmed.

It held that the scope of the federal

government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is a
question of federal law.
distinct relationships:

Petitioner's claim rested upon two
that of the serviceman to the Govern-

ment, and that of the military contractor to the Government.
of those relationships is governed by federal law.

Each

Feres, supra,

established that for the former, and cases such as Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), hold that federal
contracts are governed by federal law.

Id. at 289.

Thus, the

fact that Missouri law might permit an indemnity action in a
situation where the indemnitor would not be liable to the injured
party is not conclusive.

Instead, federal policies must be con-

sulted.

CA 8 found that the und,erlying policy of Feres dictated
rejection of petitioner's claim.

The FTCA was simply intended to

permit the application of appropriate state law.

Many of the

special considerations arising from the Government's authority over
a serviceman also apply to a military contractor.

The Government

has special privileges when it purchases military hardware, and
the

equipment is routinely moved across this country and overseas.

The fortuity that an accident occurred in one state rather than
another should not govern the liability of the United States.

CA 8 then went on to discuss the decisions from other
circuits, including CA 9's General Dynamics case.

In essence, it

noted that the circuits were confused over the proper role of
state law in this area, but that most results could be reconciled
with its own.

The court distinguished the cases that relied on

the admiralty rule,
372

u.s.
3.

~'

Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States,

597 (1963).
Contentions.

Petitioner argues that CA 8's decision

conflicts with the admiralty cases, such as Weyerhaeuser, supra,
and the remand in Treadwell Constr. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
772 (1963), a non-admiralty case.

Feres should not preclude re-

(

covery, because there is no danger of a disruption of military
discipline in a contractual suit for indemnification.

Petitioner

argues that the decision below conflicts with CA 9's Genera l
Dynamics opinion, because that court looked to state law to determine the government's liability.

Most of the remainder of the

petition is devoted to a discussion of the different results and
approaches taken by the courts of appeals in the military area
and the admiralty area.

4.

Discussion.

As indicated in the .General Dynamics

pool memo, this area seems quite confused.

CA 8's opinion in

this case went to some lengths to justify the result reached, so
this might be a good case to take.

On the other hand, if General

Dynamics is granted this Friday, there would be no need for both
(
'

\;_....

of the cases to be heard, and this could be held for it.
TherE: is
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Gene Corney

Re:

No. 76-321,
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO

The issue in this case is extremely narrow:

whether the

United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act to
indemnify a third party for damages paid to servicemen injured in
activity incident to military service.

I don't think the issue is

all that difficult, and I know for a fact that it is not all that
interesting. ~~

The

~oadent

in this case makes out a fairly rational and

logical argument for allowing a third party to seek indemnification
from the United States in circumstances such as those presented
here.

But on the whole I think the SG really has the better

position.
~

U.S. 135.

The stErting point is Feres v. United States, 340
This Court there held that Congress did not intend in

the Federal Tort Claims Act to subject the United States to suits
brought by servicemen for injuries incurred incident to military
service.

Given Feres, there is no doubt that the serviceman in

this case could not sue the United States directly.

Unless the

Court is interested in overruling Feres--which for me is an
unacceptable option--the Court should go with the SG in this case.
To hold otherwise would

undermine the results which the

----~,-------------~----------------Feres--------------Court obviously
considered necessary to the effective
functioning of the military.

I find the following points of the SG to have considerable
force:
(1) Petitioner's theory of the government's liability
is essent i ally a tort theory; indeed, it is essentially the same
theory that the serviceman would have to make if he were suing the

--

United States directly.
---.

~

suit is

,......

,...-.._.

conce ~ ded

...

Of course, Stencel can point out that its

with negligence as to it--the manufacturer--

mther than as to the serviceman.

But as Stencel really concedes,

the "character of the negligence of the United States was such as
} to create [Stencel's] liability to

JJthe

serviceman]."

Brief at

17.
(2) The reasons for barring the servieman's action apply
with almost equal force to these third party suits.

Significant,

in my view, is the fact that these third party suits would
frustrate the limited liability function of the federal compensation
statute.
<:

..,.

(3) As to equitable considerations, I think it is quite
important to note that this issue of indemnification can be handled
by contract.
-'-='

.....

Even~

if this Court rules that third party parties

cannot seek an "implied" indemnification under the Tort Claims
Act, parties can insist that the government put an express
indemnif.ication clause in the ro ntract.

They would then have a

contract claim in the Court of Claims on future injuries.

Indeed,

a ruling on this issue by this Court is only going to influence the
relative bargaining strength of the parties with respect to
negotiation of such a clause.

CONCLUSION:

Although Feres has to strain a bit to find an

exception for servicemen, I think the case was correctly decided.
To hold for respondent in this case would undermine the benefits
of the Feres ruling.
gene

Go with the SG on this one.

STENCEL AERO v. U.S.
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No. 76-321
tencel Aero Engineering
Corporation Petitioner
'
'
. dv.S
U mte
tates.

On Wnt of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Ap~
peals for the Eighth Circuit.

[May -, 1977]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
·we granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the
United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U. S. C. § 2674, to indemnify a third party for damages
paid by it to a member of the Armed Forces injured in the
course of military service.
(1)

On June 9, 1973, Captain John Donham was permanently
'injured when the egress life-support system of his F-100
fighter aircraft malfunctioned during a mid-air emergency. 1
Petitioner, Stencel Aero Engineering Corp., manufactured the
ejection system pursuant to the specifications of, and by use of
certain components provided by, the United States. 2 Pursuant to the Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U. S. C. § 321 et seq.,
made applicable to National Guardsmen by 32 U.S. C. § 318,
r'aptain Donham was awarded a life-time pension of approxim atPiy $1,500 per month . He nonetheless brought suit for
1 Captam Donham was at the timr assigned for training to the 131st
TartH·nl Fighter Group, Mis ouri National Guard .
2 Thr re 18 no rontrac1ual relationship between the United States and
.:;tpne<'l. St(•twrl rontrarted WJth North Amrriran Rockwrll, the prime
gm·Prt mwnt eontrartor, to provid(' the F-IOO's pilot eject system.

---

'16-3~1-0PINION
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the injury in the Eastern District of Missouri claiming
damages of $2,500,000. Named as defendants. inter alia, were
the United States and Stencel. Donham alleged that the
emergency eject system malfunctioned as a result of "the
negligence and carelessness of the defendants individually and
jointly."
Stencel then cross-claimed against the United States for
indemnity, charging that any malfunction in the egress life.
support system used by Donham was due to faulty specifications, requirements, and components provided by the Fnited
States or other persons under contract with the tTnited States.
The cross-claim further charged that the malfunctioning system had been in the exclusive custody and control of the
United States since the time of its manufactur<'. Stencel
therefore claimed that, insofar as it was negligent at all. its
negligence was passive, while the negligence of the UnitRcl
Htates was active. Accordingly it prayed for indemnity as to
any sums it would be required to pay to Captain Donhan1.·1
The United States moved for summary judgment against
Donham, contending that he could not recover under the
Tort Claims Act against the Government for injuries sustained
\llCident to military service. Feres v. Un'ited States, :~40 C S.
135 (1950). The U11ited States further moved for dismissal
of Stencel's cross-claim. asserting that Feres also bars a11 indemnity action by a third party for monies paid to militar·y
person11el who could not recover directly from the United
States.
The District Court granted the Government's motion:;, holdmg that Feres protected the United States both from the
·' Stencel':; indemnity cla.im is ba;;ed upon the Ja,w of Missouri. See, e. g.,
Feinstein v. Edmond Lwingston & Son.s. Inc .. 457 S. W. 2d 789, 792-793'
(:\lo . 1970), Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Payway l~'eed !lfills, Inc., 338
S W. :Zd 1 (Mo. 1960) . The FECA, of cour:sc, immfar· a;; it i~ applicable,.
trxrs the liability of !II(' Umtcd 8tate~ with reference to "tlw law of the·
place when• the [wrongful] art or om_i,sion Qel·urrr<.!." :28 U, S. C •.
~- :; l4() (b}.

76-321 ~OPINION
STENCEL AERO ENG. CORP. v. UNITED STATES

3

claims of the serviceman and that of the third party.4 Both
claims were therefore dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Stencel appealed this ruling to the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 5 and that court affirmed.
F, 2d - . We granted certiorari. 6 429 U. S. 958.

(2)
In Feres v. United States, supra, the Court held that an onduty serviceman who is injured due to the negligence of
Government officials may not recover against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. During the same
Term, in a case involving injuries to private parties, the Court
also held that the Act permits impleading the Government as
a third-party defendant, under a theory of indemnity or contribution, if the original defendant claims that the United
States was wholly or partially responsible for the plaintiff's
lllJUry.. United States v. y;ellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543
(1951). In this case we must resolve the tension between
Feres and Yellow Cab when a member of the armed services
brings a tort action against a private defendant and the latter
seeks indemnity from the United States under the Tort Claims
Still pending in the Di~trict Court i~ Donham's action again~t Stencel
nnd against Mills Mamtfacturing Corporation, another alleged tortfeasor.
:; The Di;;trict Court had properly certified its judgment as final pur;;uant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b), thereby making immediate appeal
by Stencel :tppropriate.
0 The circuits have been far from t~niform in their treatment of this is::;ue. The view taken by the Eighth Circuit in this case was first adopted
by the Ninth Circuit in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379,
404, cert. dismissed, 379 U. S. 951 (1964), and has been recently reaffirmed
111 Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 525 F. 2d 489,491 (1976), petn. for
'l'rt.. filed , 45 U. S. L. W. 31S4. Positions which appear incon;;istent with
hi;; view have been adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Barr v. United
~tatl:'s, 464 F 2d 1141, 1143-1144 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1125
t l973), and by the Fifth Circuit in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd'~ v.
~ uitl'd States, 51L F . 2d 159, 163 (1975).

7o-321-0PINION
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Act, claiming that government officials were primarily responsible for the injuries.
Petitioner argues that " [ t] he Federal Tort Claims Act
waives the Government's iiiJ.munity from suit in sweeping
language/'
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, at
547. Petitioner therefore contends that, unless its claim
falls within one of the express exceptions to the Act, the
Court should give effect to the congressional policy underlying the Act, which is to hold the United States liable under
state law principles to the same extent as a similarly situated
private individual. However, the principles of Yellow Cab
here come into conflict with the equally well-established doctrine of Feres v. United States. It is necessary, therefore, to
examine the rationale of Feres to determine to what extent, if
any, allowance of petitioner's claim would circumvent the
purposes of the Act as there construed by the Court.
Feres was an action by the executrix of a serviceman who
had been killed when the barracks in which he was sleeping
caught fire. The plaintiff claimed that the United States
had been negligent in quartering the decedent in barracks it
knew to be unsafe due to a defective heating planV While
recognizing the broad congressional purpose in passing the Act,
the Court noted that the relationship between a sovereign and
the members of its armed forces is unlike any relationship
between private individuals. 340 U. S., at 141-142. There
is thus at least a surface anomaly in applying the mandate of
the Act that "[t]he United States shall be liable ... in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances . . . . " 28 U. S. C. § 2674. Noting
that the effect of the Act was "to waive immunity from the
recognized causes of action and ... not to visit the Govern1 The Court considered two additional cases involving alleged negligence
of army offi cials. Jefferson v. United States, No. 29, and United States v.
Griggs , No. :n It i~ unnecessary, for present purposes, to detail th~
r~u~ t situations invglved in the'ie two case:s.

·'

76-321~t>PINION
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pension while he is disabled, the amount of general damages
awarded him will be reduced pro tanto, and hence his claim
against petitioner. While the contribution of the United
States bears no direct relationship to the degree of its fault, it
cannot be disputed that in all cases where a serviceman is
injured by defective equipment, the potential exposure of the
manufacturer of such equipment is substantially reduced by
the military compensation scheme. Depending on the situation, this may well redound to the benefit or to the detriment
of a particular manufacturer. In cases such as this, assuming
the accuracy of petitioner's factual claims, the manufacturer
may be required to pay monies for which it would not be
liable if the contribution of the Government were based
strictly upon degree of fault. However, it is not difficult to
posit the converse situation, where the manufacturer is totally
at fault, yet is spared from monetary liability because the
Government has fully or partially compensated the serviceman by way of pension benefits. While some Government
contractors no doubt suffer under this scheme, it cannot be
said that contractors generally are harmed.
Our second reason for rejecting petitioner's argument is
that a compensation scheme such as the Veterans' Benefits
Act serves a dual purpose: it not only provides a swift, efficient remedy for the injured serviceman, but it also clothes
the Government in the "protective mantle of the Act's limitation-of-liability provisions." See Cooper Stevedoring Co.
v. Kopke, Inc., 417 U. S. 106, 115 (1974). Given the broad
~xposure of the Government, and the great variability in the
potentially applicable tort law, see Feres, 340 U. S., at 142143, the military compensation scheme provides an upper
limit of liability: for the Government as to service-connected
injuries. To permit petitioner's claim would circumvent this
limitation. thereby frustrating one of the essential features of
the Veterans' Benefits Act. As we stated in a somewhat different context concerning the Tort Claims Act: "To permit
lwtitioner l to proceed . . here would be to judicially admit

r
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at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away
.a t the front door. We do not believe that the [Federal Tort
Claims] Act permits such a result." Laird v. Nelms, 406
U.S. 797, 802 (1972).
Turning to the third factor, it seems quite clear that where
~he Cl'\.Se concerns an injury sustained by a soldier while on
duty, the effect of the action upon military discipline is identical whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or by
a third party. The litigation would take virtually the identical form in either case, and at issue would be the degree of
fault, if any, on the part of the Government's agents and the
effect upon the serviceman's safety. The trial would, in
fither case, involve second-guessing military orders, and
would often require members of the armed services to testify
in court as to each other's decisions and actions. This factor,
too, weighs against permitting any recovery by petitioner
against the United States.
We conclude, therefore, thl'l>t the third party indemnity
action in this case is unavailable for essentially the same
reasons that the direct action by Donham is barred by Feres.
The factors considered by the Feres court are largely applicable ip this type of case as well; hence, the right of a third
party to recover in an indemnity action against the United
States recognized in Yellow Cab, supra, must be held limited
by the rationale of Feres where the injured party is a serviceman. Since the relationship between the United States and
petitioner is based on a commercial contract, there is no basis
for a claim of unfairness in this result. 8
Accordingly, the judgment qf the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.
\

.('

•

8 Since the jirst Circuit case to hold such actions barred by Feres was
decided in 1964, see n. 5, supra, petitioner no doubt had sufficient notice
so as to take this risk into account in negotiating its contract for the
~IJH>r~enc~ eject system. at issu.e b._l)r~,
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Please join me.
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Re:

No. 76-321 - Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
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Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference
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Dear Chief:
Please join me.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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Dear chief:
Please join me.
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Sincerely,
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The Chief Justice
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 25, 1977

No. 76-321, Stencel Aero Eng. Corp.
v. United States
Dear Chief,
I agree with the result you reach and expect ultimately
to join your opinion. As presently written, however, the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 6 and running through
the first half of page 7 causes me some concern.
Do we really know for certain that "to the extent that the
serviceman receives a substantial government pension while he
is disabled, the amount of general damages awarded him will
be reduced pro tanto, ... "? While I am now more than a
quarter of a century removed from day-to-day exposure to tort
law, my recollection is that a good many jurisdictions do not
permit a jury to know of a plaintiff's compensation from other
sources, e. g., private insurance or workmen's compensation,
and do not provide for a pro tanto reduction of the damages
awarded.
- - --Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~ltp'rttttt

-·

<!Jcnrt of tltt ~inittb ~tat,tll

z.l'hts~ington.

tn. tiJ.

20pJ1.,;l

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 26 , 1977

Re :
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Dear Potter :
The question you raise persuades me that , as
often happens , the discussion goes beyond the needs
of the case . The paragraph is not necessary and
should either be explicated more full y or omitted ,
and I lean to the latter .
I will be back to you soon .
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Mr . Justice Stewar t
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Dear Chief:
I, also , am troubled by the paragraph mentioned in
Potter's letter to you of May 25. If this problem could be
resolved, I could join your opinion.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
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The Conference
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Dear Chief:

I join your op1n10n as revised in accordance with
your memorandum of today.
Sincerely,
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The Chief Justice
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The Conference
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v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you
have prepared in the above.
Sincerely,
, )
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Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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June 1, 1977

No. 76-321, Stencel Aero Eng. Corp. v. U.S.
Dear Chief,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court,. as recirculated yesterday.
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Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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